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Abstract
In order to optimize the usage of testing efforts and to assess risks of software-
based systems, risk-based testing uses risk (re-)assessments to steer all phases in a test
process. Several risk-based testing approaches have been proposed in academia and/or
applied in industry, so that the determination of principal concepts and methods in
risk-based testing is needed to enable a comparison of the weaknesses and strengths
of different risk-based testing approaches. In this chapter we provide an (updated)
taxonomy of risk-based testing aligned with risk considerations in all phases of a test
process. It consists of three top-level classes, i.e., contextual setup, risk assessment,
and risk-based test strategy. This taxonomy provides a framework to understand,
categorize, assess and compare risk-based testing approaches to support their selection
and tailoring for specific purposes. Furthermore, we position four recent risk-based
testing approaches into the taxonomy in order to demonstrate its application and
alignment with available risk-based testing approaches.
1 Introduction
Testing of safety-critical, security-critical or mission-critical software faces the problem
of determining those tests that assure the essential properties of the software and
have the ability to unveil those software failures that harm the critical functions of
the software. However, also for ”normal” less critical software a comparable problem
exists: Usually testing has to be done under severe pressure due to limited resources
and tight time constraints with the consequence that testing efforts have to be focused
and be driven by business risks.
Both decision problems can adequately be addressed by risk-based testing which
consider risks of the software product as the guiding factor to steer all phases of a test
process, i.e., test planning, design, implementation, execution, and evaluation [1, 2, 3].
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Risk-based testing is a pragmatic, in companies of all sizes widely used approach [4, 5]
which uses the straightforward idea to focus test activities on those scenarios that
trigger the most critical situations of a software system [6].
Recently, the international standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 29119 Software Testing [7] on
testing techniques, processes, and documentation even explicitly specifies risk consid-
erations to be an integral part of the test planning process. Because of the growing
number of available risk-based testing approaches and its increasing dissemination in
industrial test processes [8], methodological support to categorize, assess, compare, and
select risk-based testing approaches is required.
In this paper, we present an (updated) taxonomy of risk-based testing that pro-
vides a framework for understanding, categorizing, assessing, and comparing risk-based
testing approaches and that supports the selection and tailoring of risk-based testing
approaches for specific purposes. To demonstrate the application of the taxonomy
and its alignment with available risk-based testing approaches, we position four recent
risk-based testing approaches, i.e., the RASEN approach [9], the SmartTesting ap-
proach [10], risk-based test case prioritization based on the notion of risk exposure [11]
as well as risk-based testing of open source software [12], in the taxonomy.
A taxonomy defines a hierarchy of classes (also referred to as categories, dimen-
sions, criteria or characteristics) to categorize things and concepts. It describes a tree
structure whose leaves define concrete values to characterize instances in the taxon-
omy. The proposed taxonomy is aligned with the consideration of risks in all phases
of the test process and consists of the top-level classes context (with subclasses risk
driver, quality property, and risk item), risk assessment (with subclasses factor, esti-
mation technique, scale, and degree of automation), and risk-based test strategy (with
subclasses risk-based test planning, risk-based test design & implementation, and risk-
based test execution & evaluation). The taxonomy presented in this chapter extends
and refines our previous taxonomy of risk-based testing [3].
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents back-
ground on software testing and risk management. Section 3 introduces the taxonomy
of risk-based testing. Section 4 presents the selected four recent risk-based testing
approaches and discusses them in the context of the taxonomy. Finally, Section 5
summarizes this chapter.
2 Background on Software Testing and Risk
Management
Software testing [13] is the process consisting of all lifecycle activities, both static and
dynamic, concerned with planning, preparation and evaluation of software products
and related work products to determine that they satisfy specified requirements, to
demonstrate that they are fit for purpose and to detect defects. According to this
definition it comprises static activities like reviews but also dynamic activities like
classic black or white box testing. The tested software-based system is called system
under test (SUT). As highlighted before, risk-based testing (RBT) is a testing approach
which considers risks of the software product as the guiding factor to support decisions
in all phases of the test process [1, 2, 3]. A risk is a factor that could result in future
negative consequences and is usually expressed by its likelihood and impact [13]. In
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software testing, the likelihood is typically determined by the probability that a failure
assigned to a risk occurs, and the impact is determined by the cost or severity of a
failure if it occurs in operation. The resulting risk value or risk exposure is assigned
to a risk item. In the context of testing, a risk item is anything of value (i.e., an asset)
under test, for instance, a requirement, a component or a fault.
RBT is a testing-based approach to risk management which can only deliver its full
potential if a test process is in place and if risk assessment is integrated appropriately
into it. A test process consists of the core activities test planning, test design, test
implementation, test execution, and test evaluation [13] (see Figure 1). In the following,
we explain the particular activities and associated concepts in more detail.
Test Planning
Test Design
Test Implementation
Test Execution
Test Evaluation
Figure 1: Core test process steps
According to [7] and [13], test planning is the activity of establishing or updating
a test plan. A test plan is a document describing the scope, approach, resources,
and schedule of intended test activities. It identifies, amongst others, objectives, the
features to be tested, the test design techniques, and exit criteria to be used and
the rationale of their choice. Test objectives are reason or purpose for designing and
executing a test. The reason is either to check the functional behavior of the system
or its non-functional properties. Functional testing is concerned with assessing the
functional behavior of an SUT, whereas non-functional testing aims at assessing non-
functional requirements such as security, safety, reliability or performance. The scope
of the features to be tested can be components, integration or system. At the scope of
component testing (also referred to as unit testing), the smallest testable component,
e.g., a class, is tested in isolation. Integration testing combines components with each
other and tests those as a subsystem, that is, not yet a complete system. In system
testing, the complete system, including all subsystems, is tested. Regression testing is
the selective retesting of a system or its components to verify that modifications have
not caused unintended effects and that the system or the components still comply with
the specified requirements [14]. Exit criteria are conditions for permitting a process
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to be officially completed. They are used to report against and to plan when to stop
testing. Coverage criteria aligned with the tested feature types and the applied test
design techniques are typical exit criteria. Once the test plan has been established,
test control begins. It is an ongoing activity in which the actual progress is compared
against the plan which often results in concrete measures.
During the test design phase the general testing objectives defined in the test
plan are transformed into tangible test conditions and abstract test cases. Test
implementation comprises tasks to make the abstract test cases executable. This
includes tasks like preparing test harnesses and test data, providing logging support
or writing test scripts which are necessary to enable the automated execution of test
cases. In the test execution phase, the test cases are then executed and all relevant
details of the execution are logged and monitored. Finally, in the test evaluation
phase the exit criteria are evaluated and the logged test results are summarized in a
test report.
Risk management comprises the core activities risk identification, risk analysis, risk
treatment, and risk monitoring [15, 16]. In the risk identification phase, risk items are
identified. In the risk analysis phase, the likelihood and impact of risk items and,
hence, the risk exposure is estimated. Based on the risk exposure values, the risk items
may be prioritized and assigned to risk levels defining a risk classification. In the risk
treatment phase the actions for obtaining a satisfactory situation are determined and
implemented. In the risk monitoring phase the risks are tracked over time and their
status is reported. In addition, the effect of the implemented actions is determined.
The activities risk identification and risk analysis are often collectively referred to as
risk assessment, while the activities risk treatment and risk monitoring are referred to
as risk control.
3 Taxonomy of risk-based testing
The taxonomy of risk-based testing is shown in Figure 2. It contains the top-level
classes contextual set up, risk assessment as well as risk-based test process and is aligned
with the consideration of risks in all phases of the test process. In this section, we
explain these classes, their subclasses and concrete values for each class of the risk-
based testing taxonomy in depth.
3.1 Context
The context characterizes the overall context of the risk assessment and testing pro-
cesses. It includes the subclasses risk driver, quality property and risk item to charac-
terize the drivers that determine the major assets, the overall quality objectives that
need to be fulfilled and the items that are subject to evaluation by risk assessment and
testing.
3.1.1 Risk driver
A risk driver is the first differentiating element of risk-based testing approaches. It
characterizes the area of origin for the major assets and thus determines the overall
4
Figure 2: Risk-based testing taxonomy
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quality requirements, the direction and the general set up of the risk-based testing
process. Business related assets are required for a successful business practice and
thus often directly relate to software quality properties like functionality, availability,
security and reliability. Safety relates to the inviolability of human health and life
and thus requires software to be failsafe, robust and resilient. Security addresses the
resilience of IT systems against threats that jeopardize confidentiality, integrity and
availability of digital information and realted services. Finally, Compliance relates
to assets that are directly derived from rules and regulations be it applicable laws,
standards or other forms of governing settlements. Protection of these assets often but
not exclusively relate to quality properties like security, reliability and compatibility.
3.1.2 Quality property
A quality property is a distinct quality attribute [17] which contributes to the protection
of assets and thus, is suject to risk assessment and testing. As stated in [18], risks
result from hazards. Hazards related to software-based systems stem from software
vulnerabilities and from defects in software functionalities, which are critical to business
cases, safety-related aspects, security of systems or applicable rules and regulations.
One needs to test that a software-based system is
• functionally suitable, i.e., able to deliver services as requested
• reliable, i.e., able to deliver services as specified over a period of time
• usable, i.e., satisfies the user expectation
• performant and efficient, i.e., able to react appropriately with respect to stated
resources and time
• secure, i.e., able to remain protected against accidental or deliberate attacks
• resilient, i.e., able to recover timely from unexpected events
• safe, i.e., able to operate without harmful states
The quality properties considered determine which testing is appropriate and has
to be chosen. We consider functionality, security, and reliability to be the dominant
quality properties that are addressed for software. They together form the reliabil-
ity, availability, safety, security, and resilience of a software-based system and hence
constitute the options for the risk drivers in the RBT taxonomy.
As reported by different computer emergency response teams such as GovCERT-
UK, software defects continue to be a major, if not the main source of incidents caused
by software-based systems. The quality properties determine the test types and test
techniques that are applied in a test process to find software defects or systematically
provide belief in the absence of such defects. Functional testing is likewise a major
test type in RBT to analyze reliability and safety aspects, see, e.g., [19]. In addition,
security testing including penetration testing, fuzz testing and/or randomized testing
is key in RBT [20, 21] to analyze security and resilience aspects. Furthermore, per-
formance and scalability testing focusing on normal load, maximal load, and overload
scenarios to analyze availability and resilience aspects, see, e.g., [19].
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3.1.3 Risk item
The risk item characterizes and determines the elements under evaluation. These risk
items are the elements to which risk exposures and tests are assigned [22]. Risk items
can be of type test case [11], i.e., directly test cases themselves as in regression testing
scenarios, runtime artifact like deployed services, functional artifact like requirements
or features, architectural artifact like component, or development artifact like source
code file. The risk item type is determined by the test level. For instance, functional or
architectural artifacts are often used for system testing, and generic risks for security
testing. In addition, we use the term artifact to openly refer to other risk items used in
requirements capturing, design, development, testing, deployment, and/or operation
and maintenance, which all might relate to the identified risks.
3.2 Risk assessment
The second differentiating element of RBT approaches is the way risks are being deter-
mined. According to [13], risk assessment is the process of identifying and subsequently
analyzing the identified risk to determine its level of risk, typically by assigning likeli-
hood and impact ratings. Risk assessment itself has multiple aspects, so that one needs
to differentiate further into the factors influencing risks, the risk estimation technique
used to estimate and/or evaluate the risk, the scale type that is used to characterize
the risk exposure, and the degree of automation for risk assessment.
3.2.1 Factor
The risk factors quantify identified risks [23]. Risk exposure is the quantified potential
for loss. It is calculated by the likelihood of risk occurrence multiplied by the potential
loss, also called the impact. The risk exposure considers typically aspects like liability
issues, property loss or damage, and product demand shifts. RBT approaches might
also consider the specific aspect of likelihood of occurrence, e.g., for test prioritization
or selection or the specific aspect of impact rating to determine test efforts needed to
analyze the countermeasures in the software.
3.2.2 Estimation technique
The estimation technique determines how the risk exposure is actually estimated and
can be list-based or formal model [24]. The essential difference between formal-model-
based and list-based estimation is the quantification step-that is, the final step that
transforms the input into the risk estimate. Formal risk estimation models are based
on a complex, multi-valued quantification step such as a formula or a test model. On
the other hand, list-based estimation methods are based on a simple quantification
step-for example, what the expert believes is riskiest. List-based estimation processes
range from pure ’gut feelings’ to structured, historical data including failure history
and checklist-based estimation processes.
3.2.3 Scale
Any risk estimation uses a scale to determine the risk “level”. This risk scale can
be quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative risk values are numeric and allow com-
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putations, qualitative risk values can only be sorted and compared. An often used
qualitative scale for risk levels is low, medium, and high [6].
3.2.4 Degree of automation
Risk assessment can be supported by automated methods and tools. For example, risk-
oriented metrics can be measured manually or automatically. The manual measurement
is often supported by strict guidelines and the automatic measurement is often per-
formed via static analysis tools. Other examples for automated risk assessment include
the derivation of risk exposures from formal risk models, see, for instance, [25].
3.3 Risk-based testing strategy
Based on the risks being determined and characterized, RBT follows the fundamental
test process [13] or variations thereof. The notion of risk can be used to optimize al-
ready existing testing activities by introducing risk-based strategies for prioritization,
automation, selection, resource planning etc. Dependent on the approach, nearly all
activities and phases in a test process may be impacted by taking a risk-based per-
spective. This taxonomy aims for highlighting and characterizing the RBT specifics
by relating them to the major phases of a normal test process. For the sake of brevity,
we have focused on the phases risk-based test planning, risk-based test design & imple-
mentation, and risk-based test execution & evaluation that are outlined in the following
subsections.
3.3.1 Risk-based test planning
The main outcome of test planning is a test strategy and a plan that depicts the
staffing, the required resources, as well as a schedule for the individual testing activi-
ties. Test planning establishes or updates the scope, approach, resources, and schedule
of intended test activities. Amongst others, test objectives, test techniques, and test
completion criteria, which impact risk-based testing [26], are determined.
Test objective & technique. Test objectives & techniques are relevant parts of a
test strategy. They determine what and how to test a test item. The reason to design
or execute a test, i.e., a test objective, can be related to the risk item to be tested, to
the thread scenarios of a risk item or to the counter measures established to secure
that risk item, see also Section 3.3.2. The selection of adequate test techniques can be
done of basis of the quality properties as well as from information related to defects,
vulnerabilities and threat scenarios coming from risk assessment.
Test completion criterion. Typical exit criteria for testing that are used to re-
port against and to plan when to stop testing, include all tests ran successfully, all
issues have been retested and signed off, or all acceptance criteria have been met. Spe-
cific RBT-related exit criteria [19] add criteria on the residual risk in the product and
coverage-related criteria: all risk items, their threat scenarios and/or counter measures
being covered. Risk-based metrics are used to quantify different aspects in testing such
as the minimum level of testing, extra testing needed because of high number of faults
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found, the quality of the tests and the test process. They are used to manage the RBT
process and optimize it with respect to time, efforts, and quality [19].
Resource planning & scheduling. RBT requires focusing the testing activities
and efforts based on the risk assessment of the particular product or of the project, in
which it is developed. In simple words: if there is high risk, then there will be serious
testing. If there is no risk, then there will be rather little testing. For example, products
with high complexity, new technologies, many changes, many defects found earlier,
developed by personnel with less experiences or lower qualification, or developed along
new or renewed development processes may have a higher probability to fail and need to
be tested more thoroughly. Within this context, information from risk assessment can
be used to roughly identify high-risk areas or features of the system under test (SUT)
and thus determine and optimize the respective test effort, the required personnel
and their qualification and the scheduling and prioritization of the activities in a test
process.
3.3.2 Risk-based test design & implementation
Test design is the process of transforming test objectives into test cases. This transfor-
mation is guided by the coverage criteria, which are used to quantitatively characterize
the test cases and often used for exit criteria. Furthermore, the technique of trans-
formation depends on the test types needed to realize a test objective. These test
types directly relate to the quality property defined in Section 3.1. Test implemen-
tation comprises tasks like preparing test harnesses and test data, providing logging
support or writing automated test scripts to enable the automated execution of test
cases [13]. Risk aspects are especially essential for providing logging support and for
test automation.
Coverage item determination. RBT uses coverage criteria specific to the risk
artifacts and test types specific to the risk drivers on functionality, security, and
safety. The classical code-oriented and model-based coverage criteria like path cov-
erage, condition-oriented coverage criteria like modified condition decision coverage,
requirements-oriented coverage criteria like requirements or use case coverage are ex-
tended with coverage criteria to cover selected or all assets, threat scenarios, and
counter measures [27]. While asset coverage rather belongs to requirements-oriented
coverage [6], threat scenario & vulnerability coverage, and counter measure coverage
can be addressed by code-oriented, model-based, and/or condition-oriented coverage
criteria [28].
Test or feature prioritization & selection. In order to optimize the costs
of testing and/or the quality and fault detection capability of testing, techniques for
prioritizing, selecting, and minimizing tests as well as combinations thereof have been
developed and are widely in use [29]. In the ranges of intolerable risk and “As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP)”1 risks, these techniques are used to identify
tests for the risk-related test objectives determined before. For example, design-based
1The ALARP principle is typically used for safety-critical, but also for mission-critical systems. It says
that the residual risk shall be as low as reasonably practical.
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approaches for test selection [30] and coverage-based approaches [19] for test prioriti-
zation are well-suited for RBT. Dependent on the approach prioritization & selection
can take place during different phases of the test process. A risk-based feature or re-
quirement prioritization & selection selects the requirements or features to be tested.
This activity is usually started during test planning and continued during test design.
Test case prioritization & selection requires existing test specifications or test cases. It
is thus either carried out before test implementation to determine the test case to be
implemented or in the preparation of test execution or regression testing to determine
the optimal test sets to be executed.
Test case derivation/generation. Risk assessment often comprises information
about threat scenarios, faults, vulnerabilities that can be used to derive the test data,
the test actions, probably the expected results and other testing artifacts. Especially
when addressing publicly known threat scenarios, these scenarios can be used to di-
rectly refer to predefined and reusable test specification fragments i.e., so called test
pattern. These test patterns already contain test actions and test data that are directly
applicable to either test specification, test implementation or test execution [31].
Test automation. Test automation is the use of special software (separate from
the software under test) to control the execution of tests and the comparison of actual
outcomes with predicted outcomes [32]. Experiences from test automation [33] show
possible benefits like improved regression testing or a positive return on investment,
but also caveats like high initial investments or difficulties in test maintenance. Risks
may therefore be beneficial to guide decisions where and to what degree testing should
be automated.
3.3.3 Risk-based test execution & evaluation
Test execution is the process of running test cases. In this phase, risk-based testing
is supported by monitoring and risk metrics measurement. Test evaluation comprises
decisions on the basis of exit criteria and logged test results compiled in a test report.
In this respect, risks are mitigated and may require a re-assessment. Furthermore,
risks may guide test exit decisions and reporting.
Monitoring & risk metrics measurement. Monitoring is run concurrently
with a system under test and supervises, records or analyzes the behavior of the running
system [14, 13]. Differing from software testing, which actively stimulates the system
under test, monitoring only passively observes a running system. For risk-based testing
purposes, monitoring enables additional complex analysis, e.g., of the internal state of a
system for security testing, as well as tracking the project’s progress toward resolving
its risks and taking corrective action where appropriate. Risk metrics measurement
determines risk metrics defined in the test planning phase. A measured risk metric
could be the number of observed critical failures for risk items where failure has high
impact [34].
Risk reporting. Test reports are documents summarizing testing activities and re-
sults [13] that communicate risks and alternatives requiring a decision. They typically
10
report progress of testing activities against a baseline (such as the original test plan)
or test results against exit criteria. In risk reporting, assessed risks which are moni-
tored during the test process, are explicitly reported in relation to other test artifacts.
Risk reports can be descriptive summarizing relationships of the data or predictive
using data and analytical techniques to determine the probable future risk. Typical
descriptive risk reporting techniques are risk burn down charts which visualize the de-
velopment of the overall risk per iteration as well as traffic light reports providing a high
level view on risks using colors red for high risks, yellow for medium risks and green
for low risks. A typical predictive risk reporting technique is residual risk estimation,
for instance, based on software reliability growth models [35].
Test & risk re-assessment. The re-assessment of risks after test execution may
be planned in the process or triggered by a comparison of test results against the
assessed risks. This may reveal deviations between the assessed and the actual risk level
and require a re-assessment to adjust them. Test results can explicitly be integrated
into a formal risk analysis model [36] or just trigger the re-assessment in an informal
way.
Test exit decision. The test exit decision determines if and when to stop test-
ing [22], but may also trigger further risk mitigation measures. This decision may be
taken on the basis of a test report matching test results and exit criteria or ad hoc, for
instance, solely on the basis of the observed test results.
Risk mitigation. Risk mitigation covers efforts taken to reduce either the likeli-
hood or impact of a risk [37]. In the context of risk-based testing, the assessed risks
and their relationship to test results and exit criteria (which may be outlined in the
test report), may trigger additional measures to reduce either the likelihood or impact
of a risk to occur in the field. Such measures may be bug fixing, re-design of test cases
or re-execution of test cases.
4 Classification of Recent Risk-Based Testing
Approaches
In this section, we present four recent risk-based testing approaches, i.e., the RASEN
approach (Section 4.1), the SmartTesting approach (Section 4.2), risk-based test case
prioritization based on the notion of risk exposure (Section 4.3), as well as risk-based
testing of open source software (Section 4.4), and position them in the risk-based testing
taxonomy presented in the previous section.
4.1 The RASEN approach
4.1.1 Description of the approach
The RASEN project (www.rasen-project.eu) has developed a process for combining
compliance assessment, security risk assessment and security testing based on existing
standards like ISO-31000 and ISO-29119. The approach is currently extended in the
11
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Figure 3: Combining compliance assessment, security risk assessment, and security testing
in RASEN
PREVENT project (http://www.prevent-project.org) to cover business driven security
risk and compliance management for critical banking infrastructures. Figure 3 shows
an overview of the RASEN process.
The process covers three distinguishable workstreams that each consist of a com-
bination of typical compliance assessment, security risk assessment activities and/or
security testing activities emphasizing the interplay and synergies between these former
independent assessment approaches.
1. The test-based security risk assessment workstream starts like a typical risk as-
sessment workstream and uses testing results to guide and improve the risk as-
sessment. Security testing is used to provide feedback on actually existing vulner-
abilities that have not been covered during risk assessment or allows risk values
to be adjusted on the basis of tangible measurements like test results. Security
testing should provide a concise feedback whether the properties of the target
under assessment have been really met by the risk assessment.
2. The risk-based compliance assessment workstream targets the identification and
treatment of compliance issues. It relies on security risk assessment results to
identify compliance risk and thus systematize the identification of compliance
issues. Moreover, legal risk assessment may be used to prioritize the treatment
of security issues.
3. The risk-based security testing workstream starts like a typical testing workstream
and uses risk assessment results to guide and focus the testing. Such a workstream
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starts with identifying the areas of risk within the target’s business processes and
building and prioritizing the testing program around these risks. In this setting
risks help focus the testing resources on the areas that are most likely to cause
concern or support the selection of test techniques dedicated to already identified
threat scenarios.
According ISO 31000, all workstreams start with a preparatory phase called Estab-
lishing the Context that includes preparatory activities like understanding the business
and regulatory environment as well as the requirements and processes. During this
first phase the high-level security objectives are identified and documented and the
overall process planning is done. Moreover, the process shows additional support ac-
tivities like Communication & Consult and Monitoring and Review that are meant to
set up the management perspective, thus to continuously control, react, and improve
all relevant information and results of the process. From a process point of view, these
activities are meant to provide the contextual and management related framework.
The individual activities covered in these phases might differ in detail dependent on
whether the risk assessment or testing activities are the guiding activities. The main
phase, namely the Security Assessment phase covers the definition of the integrated
compliance assessment, risk assessment and a security testing workstreams.
The risk assessment workstream. The overall risk assessment workstream is
decomposed into the three main activities Risk Identification, Risk Estimation, and Risk
Evaluation. RASEN has extended the risk identification and risk estimation activities
with security testing activities in order to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the
overall workstream.
Risk identification is the process of finding, recognizing and describing risks. This
consists og identifying sources of risk (e.g., threats and vulnerabilities), areas of impacts
(e.g., the assets), malicious events, their causes and their potential impact on assets.
In this context, security testing is used to obtain information that eases and supports
the identification of threats and threat scenarios. Appropriate are testing and analysis
techniques that yield information about the interfaces and entry points (i.e., the attack-
surface) like automated security testing, network discovery, web-crawling, and fuzz
testing.
Following risk identification, risk estimation is the process of expressing the like-
lihood, intensity, and magnitude of the identified risks. In many cases, the relevant
information on potential threats are often imprecise and insufficient, so that estima-
tion often relies on expert judgment only. This, amongst others, might result in a high
degree of uncertainty related to the correctness of the estimates. Testing or test-based
risk estimation may increase the amount of information on the target of evaluation.
Testing might in particular provide feedback regarding the resilience of systems, i.e.,
it can support the estimation of the likelihood that an attack will be successful if initi-
ated. Information from testing on the presence or absence of potential vulnerabilities
have direct impact on the likelihood values of the associated threat scenarios. Similar
to test-based risk identification, penetrating testing tools, model-based security testing
tools, static and dynamic code analysis tools, and vulnerability scanners are useful to
obtain this kind of information.
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The compliance assessment workstream. The risk-based compliance assess-
ment workstream consists of three major steps. The compliance risk identification step
provides a systematic and template based approach to identify and select compliance
requirements that imply risk. These requirements are transformed into obligations and
prohibitions that are the basis for further threat and risk modelling using the CORAS
tool. The second step, the compliance risk estimation step is dedicated to understand-
ing and documenting the uncertainty that originates from compliance requirements
interpretation. Uncertainty may arise from unclear compliance requirements or from
uncertainty about the consequences in case of non-compliance. During compliance risk
evaluation compliance requirements are evaluated and prioritized based on their level
of risk so that during treatment compliance resources may be allocated efficiently based
on their level of risk. In summary, combining security risk assessment and compliance
assessment helps prioritizing compliance measures based on risks and helps to identify
and deal with compliance requirements that directly imply risk.
The security testing workstream. The risk-based security testing workstream
is structured like a typical security testing process. It starts with a test planning phase,
followed by a test design & implementation phase and ends with test execution, analysis
and summary. The result of the risk assessment, i.e., the identified vulnerabilities,
threat scenarios and unwanted incidents, are used to guide the test planning, test
identification and may complement requirements engineering results with systematic
information concerning the threats and vulnerabilities of a system.
Factors like probabilities and consequences can be additionally used to weight threat
scenarios and thus help identifying which threat scenarios are more relevant and thus
identifying the ones that need to be treated and tested more carefully. From a pro-
cess point of view, the interaction between risk assessment and testing could be best
described following the phases of a typical testing process.
1. Risk-based security test planning deals with the integration of security risk as-
sessment in the test planning process.
2. Risk-based security test design and implementation deals with the integration of
security risk assessment in the test design and implementation process.
3. Risk-based test execution, analysis and summary deals with a risk-based test
execution as well as with the systematic analysis and summary of test results.
4.1.2 Positioning in the risk-based testing taxonomy.
Context. The overall process [38, 39] is directly derived from ISO-31000 and slightly
extended to highlight the integration with security testing and compliance assessment.
The approach explicitly addresses compliance but also business and in a limited way
safety as major risk drivers. It is defined independent from any application domain and
independent from the level, target or depth of the security assessment itself. It could be
applied to any kind of technical assessment process with the potential to target the full
number of quality properties that are defined in Section 3.1.2. Moreover, it addresses
legal and compliance issues related to data protection and security regulations. Looking
at risk-based security testing, the approach emphasizes executable risk items, i.e.,
runtime artifacts. Considering risk-based compliance assessment, the approach also
addresses the other risk items mentioned in the taxonomy.
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Risk assessment. The test-based risk assessment workstream uses test results as
explicit input to various activities of the risk assessment. Risk assessment in RASEN
has been carried out on basis of the CORAS method and language. Thus, risk esti-
mation is based on formal models that support the definition of likelihood values for
events and impact values to describe the effect of incidents on assets. Both, likelihood
and impact values are used to calculate the overall risk exposure for unwanted inci-
dents, i.e., the events that directly harm assets. CORAS is flexible with respect to the
calculation scheme as well as to the scale for defining risk factors. It generally supports
values with qualitative scale as well as with quantitative scale.
Risk-based test strategy. Security is a non-functional property and thus requires
dedicated information that addresses the (security) context of the system. While func-
tional testing is more or less guided directly by the system specification (i.e., features,
requirements, architecture), security testing often is not. The RASEN approach to
risk-based security test planning especially addresses the risk-based selection of test
objectives & test techniques as well as risk-based resource planing & and scheduling.
Security risk assessment is serving this purpose and can be used to roughly identify
high-risk areas or features of the system under test (SUT) and thus determine and
optimize the respective test effort. Moreover, a first assessment of the identified vul-
nerabilities and threat scenarios may help to select test strategies and techniques that
are dedicated to deal with the most critical security risks. Considering security test
design & implementation, especially the selection and prioritization of the feature to
test, the concrete tests design and the determination of test coverage items are critical.
A recourse to security risks, potential threat scenarios and potential vulnerabilities pro-
vide a good guidance to improve item prioritization & selection. Security risk related
information support the selection of features and test conditions that require testing.
It helps in identifying which coverage items should be covered in which depth and
how individual test cases and test procedures should look. The RASEN approach to
risk-based security test design & implementation uses information on expected threats
and potential vulnerabilities to systematically determine and identify coverage items
(besides others asset coverage, threat scenario & vulnerabilities coverage ), test con-
ditions (testable aspects of a system) and test purposes. Moreover, the security risk
assessment provides quantitative estimations on the risks, i.e., the product of frequen-
cies or probabilities and estimated consequences. This information is used to select
and prioritize either the test conditions or the actual tests when they are assembled
into test sets. Risks as well as their probabilities and consequence values are used to
set priorities for the test selection, test case generation as well as for the order of test
execution expressed by risk-optimized test procedures. Risk-based test execution al-
lows the prioritization of already existing test cases, test sets or test procedures during
regression testing. Risk-based security test evaluation aims for improving risk reporting
and the test exit decision by introducing the notion of risk coverage and remaining risks
on basis of the intermediate test results as well as on basis of the errors, vulnerabilities
or flaws that have been found during testing. In summary we have identified the three
activities that are supported through results from security risk assessment.
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4.2 The SmartTesting Approach
4.2.1 Description of the approach
Figure 4 provides an overview of the overall process. It consists of different steps,
which are either directly related to the risk-based test strategy development (shown in
bold font) or which are used to establish the preconditions (shown in normal font) for
the process by linking test strategy development to the related processes (drawn with
dashed lines) of defect management, requirements management and quality manage-
ment. The different steps are described in detail in the following subsections.
Defect 
Classification
Identification of 
Impact Factors 
1. Definition of 
Risk Items
2. Probability 
Estimation
3. Impact 
Estimation
4. Computation of 
Risk Values 
6. Definition of 
Test Strategy
7. Refinement of 
Test Strategy 
Defect 
Management
Requirements 
Management
5. Determination 
of Risk Levels
Quality 
Management
Identification of QA/
Testing Techniques Proces Step
Preparation Step
Related Process
Legend
Figure 4: SmartTesting Process [10]
Definition of risk items. In a first step, the risk items are identified and defined.
The risk items are the basic elements of a software product that can be associated with
risks. Risk items are typically derived from the functional structure of the software
system, but they can also represent non-functional aspects or system properties. In the
context of testing it should be taken into account that the risk items need to be mapped
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to test objects [13], i.e., testable objects such as sub-systems, features, components,
modules or functional as well as non-functional requirements.
Probability estimation. In this step the probability values (for which an appro-
priate scale has to be defined) are estimated for each risk item. In the context of testing
the probability value expresses the likelihood of defectiveness of a risk item, i.e., the
likelihood that a fault exists in a specific product component due to an error in a pre-
vious development phase that may lead to a failure. There are several ways to estimate
or predict the likelihood of a component’s defectiveness. Most of these approaches rely
on historical defect data collected from previous releases or related projects. Therefore,
defect prediction approaches are well suited to support probability estimation [40].
Impact estimation. In this step the impact values are estimated for each risk
item. The impact values express the consequences of risk items being defective, i.e.,
the negative effect that a defect in a specific component has on the user or customer
and, ultimately, on the company’s business success. The impact is often associated
with the cost of failures. The impact is closely related to the expected value of the
components for the user or customer. The value is usually determined in requirements
engineering when eliciting and prioritizing the system’s requirements. Thus, require-
ments management may be identified as main source of data for impact estimation.
Computation of risk values. In this step risk values are computed from the
estimated probability and impact values. Risk values can be computed according to
the definition of risk as R = P × I where P is the probability value and I is the impact
value. Aggregating the available information to a single risk value per risk item allows
the prioritization of the risk items according to their associated risk values or ranks.
Furthermore, the computed risk values can be used to group risk items, for example,
according high, medium and low risk. Nevertheless, for identifying risk levels it is
recommended to consider probability and impact as two separate dimensions of risk.
Determination of risk levels. In this step the spectrum of risk values is parti-
tioned into risk levels. Risk levels are a further level of aggregation. The purpose of
distinguishing different risk levels is to define classes of risks such that all risk items
associated to a particular class are considered equally risky. As a consequence, all risk
items of the same class are subject to the same intensity of quality assurance and test
measures.
Definition of test strategy. In this step the test strategy is defined on the basis
of the different risk levels. For each risk level the test strategy describes how testing is
organized and performed. Distinguishing different levels allows testing to be performed
with differing levels of rigor in order to adequately address the expected risks. This
can either be by achieved by applying specific testing techniques (e.g., unit testing, use
case testing, beta testing, reviews) or by applying these techniques with more or less
intensity according to different coverage criteria (e.g., unit testing at the level of 100%
branch coverage or use case testing for basic flows and/or alternative flows).
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Refinement of test strategy. In the last step the test strategy is refined to
match the characteristics of the individual components of the software system (i.e.,
risk items). The testing techniques and criteria that have been specified in the testing
strategy for a particular risk level can be directly mapped to the components associated
with that risk level. However, the test strategy is usually rather generic. It does not
describe the technical and organizational details that are necessary for applying the
specified techniques to a concrete software component. For each component, thus,
a test approach has to be developed that clarifies how the test strategy should be
implemented.
4.2.2 Positioning in the risk-based testing taxonomy
Context. SmartTesting provides a lightweight process for development and refine-
ment of a risk-based test strategy. It does not explicitly address risk drivers, but -
as in every risk-based testing process - implicitly it is assumed that a risk driver and
a quality property to be improved are available. The risk drivers of the broad range
of companies involved in the accompanying study [10] cover all types, i.e., business,
safety and compliance. Also different quality properties of interest are covered, mainly
as impact factors. For instance, in the involved companies considered performance and
security besides functionality as impact factors.
Risk assessment. SmartTesting explicitly contains a step to define risk items,
which can in principle be of any type from the taxonomy. In the case companies, risk
items were typically derived from the system’s component structure. Via the process
step computation of risk values, SmartTesting explicitly considers risk exposure, which
is qualitatively estimated by a mapping of risk values to risk levels in the process step
determination of risk levels. The risk value itself is measured based on a formal model
in the process step computation of risk values, which combines values from probability
and impact estimation. Probability estimation takes defect data into account, and
impact estimation is based on impact factors, which are typically assessed manually.
Risk-based test strategy. The process steps definition and refinement of the
test strategy comprises risk-based test planning resulting in the assignment of concrete
techniques, resource planning and scheduling, prioritization and selection strategies,
metrics as well as exit criteria to the risk levels and further to particular risk items.
4.3 Risk-based test case prioritization based on the no-
tion of risk exposure
4.3.1 Description of the approach
Choi et. al. present different test case prioritization strategies based on the notion of
risk exposure. In [11], test case prioritization is described as an activity with the aim
“to find the most important defects as early as possible against the lowest costs” [26].
Choi et. al. claim that their risk-based approach to test case prioritization performs
well against this background. They empirically evaluate their approach in a setting
where various versions of a Traffic Conflict Avoidance System (TCAS) are tested and
show how their approach performs well compared to the prioritization approach of
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others. In [41] the approach is extended using an improved prioritization algorithm
and towards an automated risk estimation process using fuzzy expert systems. A
fuzzy expert system is an expert system that uses fuzzy logic instead of Boolean logic
to reason about data. Conducting risk estimation with this kind of expert system, Choi
et al. aim to replace the human actor during risk estimation and thus avoid subjective
estimation results. The second approach has been evaluated by prioritizing test cases
for two software products, the electronic health record software iTrust, an open source
product, and an industrial software application called Capstone.
4.3.2 Positioning in the risk-based testing taxonomy
Context. Both approaches do not explicitly mention one of the risk drivers from
Section 3.1.1 nor do they provide exhaustive information on the addressed quality
properties. However, in [11] the authors evaluate their approach in context of a safety
critical application. Moreover, the authors emphasize that they refer to risks that
are identified and measured during the product risk assessment phase. Such a phase is
typically prescribed for safety critical systems. Both facts indicate that safety seems to
be the majorrisk driver and the safety relevant attributes like functionality, reliability
and performance are the major quality properties that are addressed by testing. In
contrast, the evaluation in [41] is carried out with business critical software considering
quality properties like functionality and security. Both approaches have in common
that they do not address compliance as a risk driver.
Risk assessment. The risk assessment process for both approaches aim for calcu-
lating risk exposure. The authors define risk exposure as a value with quantitative scale
that express the magnitude of a given risk. While in [11] the authors explicitly state
that they are intentionally not using their own testing related equivalent for expressing
risk exposure but directly refer to risk values coming from a pre-existing risk assess-
ment, risk estimation in [41] is done automatically and tailored towards testing. The
authors calculate risks on basis of a number of indicators that are harvested from devel-
opment artifacts like requirements. They use properties like requirements modification
status and frequency as well as requirements complexity and size to determine the risk
likelihood and risk impact for each requirement. In addition indicators on potential
security threats are used to address and consider the notion of security. In contrast
to [11], [41] addresses the automation of the risk estimation process using an expert
system that is able to aggregate the risk indicators and thus to automatically compute
the overall risk exposure. While [11] does not explicitly state whether the initial risk
assessment relies on formal models or not, the approach in [41] is completely formal.
However, since [11] refers to safety critical systems, we can assume that the assessment
is not just a list-based assessment.
Risk-based test strategy. With respect to testing, both approaches aim for an
efficient test prioritization & selection algorithm. Thus, they are mainly applicable
in situations where test cases or at least test case specifications are already available.
This addresses first of all regression testing but as well decision problems during test
management, e.g., when test cases are already specified and the prioritization of test
implementation efforts is required.
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To obtain an efficient test prioritization strategy, both approaches aim for deriving
risk related weights for individual test cases. In [11], the authors propose two different
strategies. The first strategy aims for simple risk coverage. Test cases that cover a
given risk, obtain a weight that directly relates to the risk exposure for that risk. If
a test case covers multiple risks, the risk exposure values are summed. The second
strategy additionally tries to consider the fault revealing capabilities of the test cases.
Thus, the risk related weight for a test case is calculated by means of the risk exposure
for a given risk correlated with the number of risk-related faults that are detectable
by that test case, so that test cases with a higher fault revealing capabilities are rated
higher. Fault revealing capabilities of test cases are derived through mutation analysis,
i.e., this strategy requires that the test cases already exist and that they are executable.
In [41], test cases are prioritized on basis of their relationship to risk-rated re-
quirements. Risk rating for requirements is determined by an automated risk rating
conducted by the fuzzy expert system and an additional analysis of fault classes and
their relation to the individual requirements. In short, a fault class is considered to
have more impact if it relates to requirements with a higher risk exposure. In addition,
a fault of given fault class is considered to occur more often if that fault class relates to
a larger number of requirements. Both values determine the overall risk rating for the
individual requirements and thus provide the prioritization criteria for requirements.
Test cases finally are ordered by means of their relationship to the prioritized require-
ments. During the evaluation of the approach, the authors obtained the relationship
between test cases and requirements from existing traceability information.
While both approaches provide strong support for risk-based item selection, they
do not support other activities during risk-based test design & implementation nor do
they establish dedicated activities in the area of risk-based test execution & evaluation.
4.4 Risk-based testing of Open Source Software
4.4.1 Description of the approach
Yahav et al. [12, 42] provide an approach to risk-based testing of open source software
(OSS) to select and schedule dynamic testing based on software risk analysis. Risk
levels of open source components or projects are computed based on communication
between developers and users in the open source software community. Communication
channels usually include mail, chats, blogs and repositories of bugs and fixes. The
provided data-driven testing approach therefore builds on three repositories, i.e., a
social repository which stores the social network data from the mined OSS community,
a bug repository which links the community behavior and OSS quality, as well as a
test repository which traces test (scripts) to OSS projects. As a preprocessing step,
OSS community analytics is performed to construct a social network of communication
between developers and users. In a concrete case study [42], the approach predicts the
expected number of defects for a specific project with logistic regression based on the
email communication and the time since the last bug.
4.4.2 Positioning in the risk-based testing taxonomy
Context. The approach does not explicitly mention one of the risk drivers from
Section 3.1.1 nor of the quality properties. However, the authors state that the purpose
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for risk-based testing is the experienced significant failures in product quality, timeliness
and delivery cost when adapting OSS components in commercial software packages [12].
Therefore, risk drivers may be business to guarantee the success of a system, where
the tested OSS component is integrated, or even safety, if the OSS component would
be integrated into a safety-critical system. Due to the testing context, i.e., selection
or prioritization of available tests of OSS components, the main quality property is
supposed to be functionality. The risk item type are OSS components (developed in
OSS projects), i.e., architectural artifacts.
Risk Assessment. The risk assessment approach quantifies the likelihood. For
this purpose, a formal model is created to predict the number of bugs based on the
communication in different communities and the time since the last bug. The scale is
therefore quantitative as the approach tries to predict the actual number of bugs. The
approach implements an automatic assessment as it uses monitors to automatically
store data in repositories and then applies machine learning approaches, i.e., logistic
regression, to predict the risk level.
Risk-based test strategy. The approach explicitly supports risk-based test plan-
ning in terms of test prioritization & selection and resource planning & scheduling. The
approach mainly addresses the allocation of available test scripts for dynamic testing
and highlights that exhaustive testing is infeasible and that therefore selective test-
ing techniques are needed to allocate test resources to the most critical components.
Therefore, risk-based test design is not explicitly addressed. As risk metrics the num-
ber of communication metrics as well as the time since the last defect are computed.
The approach uses specific logging support to log and trace community and defect data.
For risk reporting confusion matrices are used, which contrast the actual and predicted
number of defects.
5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a taxonomy of risk-based testing. It is aligned with
the consideration of risks in all phases of the test process and consists of three top-
level classes, i.e., contextual set up, risk assessment, and risk-based test strategy. The
contextual set up is defined by risk drivers, quality properties and risk items. Risk
assessment comprises the subclasses factors, estimation technique, scale, and degree of
automation. The risk-based test strategy then takes the assessed risks into account
to guide test planning, test design & implementation, as well as test execution &
evaluation. The taxonomy provides a framework to understand, categorize, assess
and compare risk-based testing approaches to support their selection and tailoring for
specific purposes. To demonstrate its application and alignment with available risk-
based testing approaches, we positioned four recent risk-based testing approaches, i.e.,
the RASEN approach, the SmartTesting approach, risk-based test case prioritization
based on the notion of risk exposure as well as risk-based testing of Open Source
Software, in the taxonomy.
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